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I. INTRODUCTION
Immigration and citizenship are both fraught areas of policy. The
federal government has long exercised broad authority over
immigration and the status of aliens; that authority is often tested by
states.1 And immigration and citizenship both raise difficult trade-offs.
Americans live in a country dedicated to the proposition that “all men
are created equal” and entitled to “unalienable” rights.2 That
proposition seems to favor relatively welcoming immigration policies
and relatively easy paths to state and national citizenship. But our
founding documents also take for granted that we constitute “one
people,”3 and on that basis general commitments to human equality
and freedom may need to be reconciled with considerations that limit
access to the United States and United States citizenship.
In his recent book Local Citizenship in a Global Age,4 Kenneth
Stahl studies a slice of immigration and citizenship policy. The book
focuses on the efforts of a few cities in the United States to chart their
own courses on topics associated with immigration and citizenship.
The book has two main claims. First, the United States “practice[s]
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V8.I1.1
†

Professor, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University.
1. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
2. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
3. Id.
4. KENNETH A. STAHL, LOCAL CITIZENSHIP IN A GLOBAL AGE (forthcoming).
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‘citizenship federalism’”; “citizenship” gets “distributed at multiple
scales” of government “simultaneously, and often on divergent
grounds.”5 Second, today, when governments disagree with each other
about immigration and citizenship policy, the disputants are usually
local governments on one hand and the federal government on the
other.6 Today, “states play[] a passive role” in debates over
immigration and citizenship policy, while “local and federal
governments tend to distribute citizenship in ways that are . . . in direct
contradiction.”7
To describe the different views that lead governments to disagree
about immigration and citizenship, Local Citizenship in a Global Age
introduces many different models of citizenship. It argues that three
models have dominated to this point. One is a “republican” model,
which expects citizens to “exercise [their] judgment to the best interest
of the [community] without regard to [their] own personal financial or
familial interest.”8 In the “liberal” model, citizenship is not so much
“a set of civic responsibilities” as a status; it entails “the right of an
individual to own private property and safeguard it.” Since citizenship
does not entail many responsibilities in the liberal model, that model
can “be extended far and wide.”9 In contrast with both the republican
and the liberal models, “the ethno-nationalist [model] considers
citizenship a device for linking a group of people together under the
banner of a shared culture or identity.”10 Local Citizenship in a Global
Age also introduces two models for municipal governments to institute
going forward—models of postmodern and differentiated citizenship,
both of which delink citizenship in a municipality from citizenship in
that municipality’s state and country.11
Local Citizenship in a Global Age is an enriching book. It calls
attention to some important developments in local government,
citizenship, and immigration policy. It conveys wonderfully how
messy the law and politics are around immigration and citizenship.
And the book is imaginative when it makes recommendations about
immigration and citizenship policy at the municipal level.
In this review Essay, I survey the most valuable lessons from
Local Citizenship in a Global Age. But I have some reservations about
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 26.
See id. at 191–224.
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the book, and I want to mark those off as well. The book comes off as
critical of views that seek to control immigration and to establish
relatively demanding criteria for noncitizens to become citizens. In my
view, two factors contribute to this impression, and the book would
have been more satisfying if both had been addressed.
First, Local Citizenship in a Global Age does not account for a
phenomenon I call here “cosmopolitanism.”12 The book focuses a
great deal on the possibility that opponents oppose open immigration
and easy citizenship because they are too attached to race or
nationality—hence the ethno-nationalist model of citizenship.13 But
people can also be detached from their own communities, and
particularly from the habits and values that help constitute community
life and make it satisfying. Sometimes that detachment is appropriate,
sometimes it is not, and in either case the tendency needs to be studied.
That tendency is called “cosmopolitan” in this Essay. I suspect that
cosmopolitanism plays a role in the events and policies studied in
Local Citizenship in a Global Age. I also suspect that cosmopolitanism
shapes policy conflicts as much as Stahl’s “liberal,” “republican,” and
“ethno-nationalist” models.
Second, Local Citizenship in a Global Age does not portray in
their most favorable light the concerns that lead some citizens to
oppose high-volume immigration and easy paths to citizenship. The
book suggests that policies that oppose open immigration and easy
citizenship cannot be grounded in liberal views.14 Again, the book
assumes there are three main models of citizenship—liberal,
republican, and ethno-nationalist.15 It seems easy to justify policies
that oppose open immigration and easy citizenship on grounds that
seem (to lay people) communitarian or (in Stahl’s presentation)
republican. It also seems easy to associate those policies with ethnonationalist desires, though those associations come nowhere close to a
defense. But those policies seem impossible to square with liberal
tenets about government, freedom, and justice. Yet many political and
thought leaders have assumed that a program for government can at
once be liberal and patriotic—supportive of country, one’s people, and
12. Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, BOS. REV. (Oct. 1,
1994), http://bostonreview.net/martha-nussbaum-patriotism-and-cosmopolitanism
[https://perma.cc/4V6H-TYQF]. Nussbaum made this contrast popular, and I follow
her usage here. Nussbaum later expanded her thoughts on both in MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, THE COSMOPOLITAN TRADITION: A NOBLE BUT FLAWED IDEAL (2019).
13. See STAHL, supra note 4, at 102.
14. Id. at 59–60.
15. Id. at 21.
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one’s way of life. I want to sketch an account of patriotic liberal
theories and explain the implications for the argument in Local
Citizenship in a Global Age.
This Essay’s argument proceeds as follows. Part II restates the
argument of Local Citizenship in a Global Age. Part III surveys the
book’s strengths and highlights my main concerns. Part III identifies
the void in the book that cosmopolitanism would fill, and Part IV
discusses the psychological tendencies that contribute to the
cosmopolitan mindset. Part V explains why liberal theories of
government can incorporate patriotic elements, and Part VI outlines
the main concerns that animate patriotic liberal theories. Part VII
explains the implications that Parts III through VI have for Local
Citizenship in a Global Age.
II. THE ARGUMENT OF LOCAL CITIZENSHIP IN A GLOBAL AGE
Local Citizenship in a Global Age proceeds in three parts. Part I
supplies the background readers will need to follow the rest of the
book’s argument. Chapter 1 introduces the three models of
citizenship—liberal, republican, and ethno-nationalist. Chapter 2
shows how citizenship is regulated by different levels of government
in the American federal system. Many assume that central
governments reserve plenary authority to grant or withhold
citizenship. Nevertheless, in practice, the federal government
“determine[s] who qualifies as a citizen based on characteristics such
as identity or demonstrated loyalty,” while local governments make
de facto determinations who count as citizens by deciding whom to
give advantages like public benefits, public services, and protection
from land-use regulations.16 Chapter 3 supplies a quick overview of
local citizenship in the ancient world . . . and the transition in the
Western world from small city-states with republican citizens to
extended nation-states with less demanding expectations of
citizenship.17
Part II presents three case studies of local citizenship in action.
Chapter 4 studies how United States municipalities and (later) states
enfranchised women before the Nineteenth Amendment.18 A few
American municipalities have extended perquisites of citizenship to
noncitizen residents, and Chapter 5 studies these extensions—to the
16. Id. at 40; see id. at 41.
17. See id. at 69–81.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; see id. at 85–95.
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franchise, to access to health care and local banking institutions, or to
equal access to benefits of state citizenship like public education,
tuition discounts, and state-supported health care.19 Some
municipalities extend perquisites of citizenship to nonresident
landowners, and Chapter 6 studies those extensions.20 When Stahl
interprets all of these developments, he relies on the three models of
citizenship introduced in Chapter 1. When federal authorities made
and administered national citizenship policies, they focused on
concerns that loom large in republican or ethno-nationalist models.
Because local citizenship is so far removed from national citizenship,
Stahl argues, they could focus on the concerns that justify the liberal
model.21 But politics have gotten more complicated in the last 50 years
because of globalization. Because “globalization is destabilizing”
existing political orders and distinctions, “the distinction between
local and federal citizenship is breaking down.”22 “[T]he liberal
conception of citizenship that prevails at the local level has bled into
the federal level,” and that bleeding has “unsettl[ed] the ethnonationalist and republican conceptions thought to be safely enshrined
there.”23 Chapter 7 demonstrates that claim.
Part III considers three alternative models of citizenship. Chapter
8 explains why it is necessary to consider alternatives: If the models
studied in Part II are unraveling, then theorists and policymakers need
new models to replace the unraveling ones. Chapter 9 studies one
possible source for such a model: neo-republican theories of
citizenship. But Stahl finds neo-republicanism wanting; he argues that
municipalities are expanding their franchises and offering public
benefits to a wide range of noncitizens in “direct response to the
failures of nation-state citizenship.”24 Chapter 10 considers
postmodern citizenship, in which “citizenship consists largely of
accommodating oneself to the wide diversity and difference of urban
life.”25 But Chapter 10 also offers a sober warning about postmodern
citizenship. Because this conception “refus[es] to draw any boundaries
19. See STAHL, supra note 4, at 97.
20. See id. at 124–40.
21. See id. at 92–93, 103, 127.
22. Id. at 142.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 175 (citing and criticizing MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE,
38–39 (1983)).
25. Id. at 192 (citing GERALD FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES
WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS (1999); Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 23 (1998)).
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around places at all” in public life, it may—however unintentionally—
encourage residents to “flee to neighboring suburban communities
where they can exercise more control over their environments.”26
Chapter 11 offers what Stahl portrays as a compromise between neorepublican and postmodern models—“differentiated citizenship.”27
Differentiated citizenship encourages people to develop political
relationships not directly between themselves and the state but instead
through the media of “cultural group[s]”—“different national, ethnic,
or religious groups to which they belong”—“intermediate between the
individual and the state.”28
III. ASSESSING LOCAL CITIZENSHIP IN A GLOBAL AGE
Local Citizenship in a Global Age is an enriching book. It tackles
several of the most pressing topics in politics today. As Stahl observes,
Donald Trump became President of the United States in large part
because he voiced concerns about American foreign and citizenship
policy that few conventional politicians had been willing to raise.29
The same questions have roiled politics in Europe; they contributed to
the five years of turmoil that the United Kingdom went through before
it withdrew from the European Union.30
Stahl offers many fine insights on these topics. Chapters 5 and 6
in particular contribute significantly to legal and political science
scholarship on citizenship policy. Chapter 5 provides an invaluable
report on the efforts of states and municipalities in the United States
to extend to people who are not U.S. citizens voting rights and benefits
that often run with citizenship. Chapter 6 fills an important gap when
it recounts changes by municipal governments to extend the franchise
to nonresident landowners.
Local Citizenship in a Global Age also provides a helpful primer
about municipal and state citizenship policy in a global age. As I
explain below, Stahl and I probably disagree whether the trends he
describes in his book can or should be reversed. But if one grants that
globalization is hard to reverse, Chapters 9, 10, and 11 help mark off
26. Id. at 208, 204.
27. Id. at 208 (crediting WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP
(1995); IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990)).
28. Id. at 208–09.
29. See id. at 1–5.
30. See, e.g., James McBride, What Brexit Means, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.:
BACKGROUNDERS
(last
updated
July
22,
2019
8:00
AM),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-brexit-means
[https://perma.cc/9AW4BH83].
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the choices that policy makers must make. Republican citizenship,
postmodern citizenship, and differentiated citizenship present
different models of citizenship, and those models should help readers
appreciate what local citizenship might entail in an age in which
globalization seems to be weakening people’s attachments to their
political communities.
Which takes me to the last enriching feature of Local Citizenship
in a Global Age: The book makes readers think hard about citizenship
and political allegiance. Someone who lives in Takoma Park is at once
a resident of a municipality, a state (Maryland), a nation-state (the
United States), and in some sense the world. The first three
jurisdictions have some claims on that person’s allegiance, and maybe
the world does now, too. Does every one of those jurisdictions need to
march in lockstep with the others when it sets policy about
citizenship? Clearly not, and Local Citizenship in a Global Age
convinces me as much. How should citizenship be structured? At its
core, citizenship consists of a status and the right to vote in a
jurisdiction’s elections. Does it also entail rights of access to public
assistance services? Rights of access to education? Rights to be free
from investigation and possible deportation by other sovereigns? How
do we classify people to whom a municipality extends some of these
advantages but not all? I had not considered issues like these before
reading Local Citizenship in a Global Age, and I am grateful to Stahl
for forcing me to think them through.
Even so, I am not persuaded by the main argument in Local
Citizenship in a Global Age. I favor immigration and citizenship
policies that combine what Stahl calls liberal and republican
elements—a mix that I call “natural rights republicanism.”31 In my
opinion, a just political community should be at once (in Stahl’s
formulation) liberal and republican. Such a community should be
liberal in “its dedication to equality and natural rights,” but it should
be republican in maintaining “public morals . . . inculcat[ing] respect
for equality and natural rights.”32 Probably because I find natural
31. Eric R. Claeys, Review of Thomas G. West, The Political Theory of the
American Founding: Natural Rights, Public Policy, and the Moral Conditions of
Freedom, 44 INTERPRETATION 319, 319 (2018).
32. Id. at 321–22; see also Eric R. Claeys, The Private Society and the Liberal
Public Good in John Locke’s Thought, 25 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 201 (2008)
(interpreting JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (Rob Hay ed.,
McMaster University Archive of the History of Economic Thought 2004) and JOHN
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (1690)).
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rights republicanism satisfying, I am more interested in studying
citizenship at the state and national levels (pace Stahl) and less so in
studying it at the municipal and global levels. In my opinion, the
weakening of state and national citizenship could have been arrested
more than is assumed in Part II of Local Citizenship in a Global Age.
It should come as no surprise, then, that I have two broad concerns
about Local Citizenship in a Global Age. I worry that the book does
not account adequately for some of the forces that have destabilized
state and national citizenship. I also worry that the book does not
portray charitably enough views that might justify policies limiting
immigration and setting demanding criteria for citizenship. The first
concern is taken up in the next two Parts of this Essay, and the second
concern is discussed in Parts V and VI.
IV. IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND COSMOPOLITANISM
Let me start with my concern about the forces that question the
primacy that state and national governments have traditionally
exercised over immigration and citizenship policy. Stahl’s three-part
taxonomy seems to be missing a possibility. Again, Local Citizenship
in a Global Age introduces three models of citizenship—liberal,
republican, and ethno-nationalist.33 The liberal and republican models
are obviously normative models. As Stahl portrays them, “liberal”
arguments always militate in favor of strong individual rights, and
they deny communities authority to withhold laws protecting those
rights.34 “Republican” arguments always militate in favor of strong
communities—a strong sense of “public”—and relatively closed
communities at that.35 The ethno-nationalist model, by contrast, is not
normative. The traits that move people to be loyal to race or country
are facts about human nature; they describe psychological forces that
structure human sociability.36 These forces can be coopted toward
goals both good and bad but are themselves morally neutral.
In short, Local Citizenship in a Global Age introduces both
normative and psychological models, and those models cut in different
directions in citizenship and immigration policy. To appreciate how
the models relate to each other and to relevant theory, we can arrange
them in a table:

33.
34.
35.
36.

See STAHL, supra note 4, at 21.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id. at 26.
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Table 1. Models of citizenship37
Policy For restricting
immigration (and, for
Type
making citizenship
difficult to earn)
Normative
Republican
Psychological Ethno-nationalist

9

For opening
immigration (and, for
making citizenship easy
to earn)
Liberal
?

As Table 1 helps show, something seems missing. Ethnonationalism covers the psychological forces that might lead people to
favor keeping their political communities relatively closed, restricting
immigration, and restricting access to citizenship only to people who
resemble existing citizens relatively closely.38 As Local Citizenship in
a Global Age suggests, however, for a couple of generations, these
forces have been losing ground.39 So it seems reasonable to ask
whether the passions that lead people to embrace ethno-nationalist
views are getting confronted and even overridden by other opposing
passions.
I can think of such a cluster of passions. The passions in this
cluster have been described in a few different ways. The most
sympathetic descriptive term is “cosmopolitan.” Cosmopolitans find
connections that people have besides their national identities more
ennobling than connections tied to those identities.40 As Martha
Nussbaum portrays things, politics can be based on three different
elements: “ethnic and racial and religious difference,” “shared
national identity,” and “[w]hat we share as rational and mutually
dependent human beings.”41 Cosmopolitans believe that the third
element takes priority over the first two: People are not “above all
citizens of the United States” or any other country but instead “above
all citizens of a world of human beings.”42 The best-known
unsympathetic descriptor is “oikophobic.” “Oikophobia” is a
neologism developed by Roger Scruton. It plays on another
neologism, the word “xenophobia,” which conjoins the Greek words

37. Id. at 38–39.
38. Id. at 27–28.
39. Id. at 21.
40. Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, BOS. REV. (Oct. 1,
1994), http://bostonreview.net/martha-nussbaum-patriotism-and-cosmopolitanism
[https://perma.cc/4V6H-TYQF].
41. Id.
42. Id.
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xenos (stranger, or foreigner) and phobia (fear).43 “Oikophobic”
switches out xenos and inserts instead the Greek word oikos, for
“home.”44 Scruton argues that oikophobia fairly describes tendencies
that motivate intellectuals, particularly intellectuals in a society with a
mass culture.45 Intellectuals tend to find more in common with
intellectuals from other cultures than they find with non-intellectuals
from their own cultures. In addition, because intellectuals like to
manipulate ideas, they dislike being tied to existing ways of doing
things and existing orders.46 Many intellectuals “see[] that which is
[their] own, [their] inheritance, as alien,” Scruton argues, and they feel
“tainted by its claim on [them].”47 In response, intellectuals often
“portray [their] home as something Other, by means of a stereotype
that seems to free [them] from all obligation toward it,” and they tend
to see “other cultures” and people of those cultures “through a
sentimental haze.”48
Scruton describes accurately many of the passions that motivate
intellectuals. When it comes to choosing terms to describe those
motivations, however, I will follow Nussbaum and not Scruton. In
part, I do so for reasons of charity. Like “xenophobic,” “oikophobic”
does not seem a term appropriate to civil discourse about a fraught
topic.49 And in part, I do so to make the term I use to describe people
who mistrust closed communities track its opposite, “ethnonationalist.” Like ethno-nationalist political passions, cosmopolitan
passions can be coopted in good and bad causes. Some people want to
improve the lots of individual peoples and social groups, and they
earnestly believe that local practices and lifestyles hold those people
and groups back. In some contexts, those motivations can make
people’s lives better. In the wrong contexts, however, those same
motivations can backfire. Cosmopolitan policies can be wellintentioned and yet destabilize local social institutions that mutually
dependent beings need to prosper. The policies that Stahl describes as
republican can be reinforced, for better or worse, by social passions he
43. The History of the Word ‘Xenophobia,’ MERRIAM WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/a-short-history-of-xenophobia
[https://perma.cc/NW4N-XSAB] (last visited Mar. 22, 2021).
44. Roger Scruton, Oikophobia, 175 J. EDUC. 93, 96 (1993).
45. Id. at 96.
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 97.
49. The term “xenophobic” detracts from the argument when used in Local
Citizenship in a Global Age. See STAHL, supra note 4, at 17, 176, 191, 207.
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describes as ethno-nationalist. By the same token, policies he
describes as liberal can be reinforced, for better or worse, by
sentiments and social passions that might fairly be called
cosmopolitan. The argument of Local Citizenship in a Global Age
seems incomplete without an account of those latter sentiments and
passions.
V. NATURAL RIGHTS, COSMOPOLITANISM, AND PATRIOTISM
In Part III, I warned that Local Citizenship in a Global Age may
not portray charitably enough views that might justify restricting
immigration and setting demanding criteria for noncitizens to become
citizens. I want to come back to that warning here. To illustrate my
concern, I will study the ways in which the book uses the term
“liberal” and the phrase “natural rights.” As used in Local Citizenship
in a Global Age, these terms always support policies for open political
communities and easy-to-satisfy citizenship tests. But these terms can
also be used to support policies that make national and local
citizenship respectable. In other words, not every political program
that is liberal and devoted to natural rights is cosmopolitan; some such
programs justify what might be called “patriotic” commitments.
As portrayed in Local Citizenship in a Global Age, “liberalism
asserts that all human beings have natural rights,” and “liberal
citizenship should in principle be available to all regardless of
nationality.”50 Not necessarily. To avoid confusion, I do not mean to
suggest that Stahl is using “liberal” or “natural rights” in misleading
or idiosyncratic senses. “Liberal” and “natural rights” can take on
different meanings in different contexts. On one hand, “liberal” and
“natural rights” are both theoretical concepts. When theoretical
concepts are introduced and defended in theoretical discussions, they
can be justified carefully with qualifications to alleviate any extreme
tendencies they have. On the other hand, “liberal” and “natural rights”
can also be applied straightaway to political life. In the rough and
tumble of political life, they tend to be applied as slogans with few or
no qualifications. Local Citizenship in a Global Age assumes that
“liberal” and “natural rights” have the meanings they have in slogan
portraits and in libertarian political theories. But other political
theories appeal to natural rights and liberalism at a fundamental level
50. Id. at 29. Although Stahl speaks specifically of Lockean liberalism, this
passage explains how he relies on his so-called “liberal” model throughout the rest
of the book.
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to justify many practical policies that laypeople would associate with
love of one’s own country. Again, I have associated such theories with
“natural rights republicanism.” But one could just as plausibly call
such theories “patriotic liberal” theories, and that is the phrase I use
here.
VI. COOPTING PATRIOTISM FOR LIBERALISM AND NATURAL RIGHTS
Patriotic liberal theories should not seem outlandish or farfetched. Although the United States Declaration of Independence is
dedicated (again) to natural rights and equality, it is a declaration for
“one people” resolved “to dissolve the political bands which have
connected them with another” and set “to assume [a] separate and
equal station” as an independent nation.51 Although claims like these
may sound paradoxical, they rest on reasonable and serious concerns.
Consider how Nussbaum justifies cosmopolitan political projects:
Such projects respect peoples’ equal rights to develop their capacities
as rational, mutually dependent beings.52 But what if it turns out that,
precisely because people are mutually dependent beings, they need
their social lives ordered? And what if social order hinges on people’s
agreeing to norms and goals that are common in their community but
disputed by many other people? Thomas Jefferson, lead author of the
Declaration, assumed that people needed to agree on basics of social
and political life to be free: “It is for the happiness of those united in
society to harmonize as much as possible in matters which they must
of necessity transact together.”53
When liberal and natural rights theories require patriotic qualities,
they rely on several reinforcing considerations. Four stand out.54
First, when citizens like their country and trust their fellow
citizens, the affection and trust help secure individual rights. People
cannot be secure in their natural rights unless fellow citizens respect
them as bearers of natural rights. In principle, as a matter of prepolitical morality, all people are equally entitled to natural rights.
Sadly, however, in practice, many people do not recognize or accept
that claim. In many times and places, people have believed that they
do not need to follow principles of justice when they transact with
51. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
52. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 12, at 2.
53. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, in THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 120 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907).
54. ERIC R. CLAEYS, NATURAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (forthcoming). The
arguments in this Part are drawn from chapter 2 of the forthcoming book.
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people they classify as Others—people from another family, tribe,
ethnicity, religious sect, or political faction.55 After the United States
deposed Saddam Hussein, violence erupted in Iraq, and much of the
violence has been motivated by mistrust among Iraqi Sunnis, Shiítes,
and Kurds.56 In Federalist No. 2, John Jay was optimistic that the
Constitution of 1787 would not lead the peoples of the several states
into similar violence. But Jay was confident because he believed that
state citizens were members of “one united people . . . descended from
the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same
religion, attached to the same principles of government, [and] very
similar in their manners and their customs.”57 Stahl cites this passage
as an example of the ethno-nationalist model.58 But Jay made these
observations in an argument that the Constitution of 1787 would
secure the American people their natural rights more effectively than
the Articles of Confederation were securing them.59
Second, patriotism can make people more secure in natural rights
associated with personal safety and collective security. Sadly, nations
and peoples may need to go to war to defend their citizens and
possessions. Before a nation goes to war, it is reasonable for its people
to expect all citizens to be loyal enough to the government and its
projects to contribute to their defense. Stahl justly gives John Locke
significant credit in ushering in political liberalism.60 Locke assumed
that all commonwealths could and should “not permit[] any part of
their Dominions to be dismemb[e]red, nor to be enjoyed by any but
those of their Community.”61 A community may justly reserve
property ownership to “those of their community,” Locke insisted, and
the reasonable explanation is that people whose property is protected
by a commonwealth have more stake in fighting for it.
55. Michelle Maiese, Principles of Justice and Fairness, BEYOND
INTRACTABILITY
(July
2003,
last
updated
July
2020),
https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/principles_of_justice
[https://perma.cc/9SQF-3JMT].
56. See Prejudice in Iraq: Shiítes, Sunni, and Kurds, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM,
https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/news-wires-white-papers-andbooks/prejudice-iraq-shiites-sunni-and-kurds [https://perma.cc/WME8-7USS] (July
10, 2021).
57. THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, at 6 (John Jay) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001).
58. See STAHL, supra note 4, at 27.
59. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, supra note 57, at 5.
60. See STAHL, supra note 4, at 24.
61. LOCKE, supra note 32, at 346. For readers who cannot access the version of
the Two Treatises cited here, the quote in the text comes from the Second Treatise,
chapter VIII, section 117.
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Third, a liberal community needs to be communitarian in a few
specific dimensions—most of all, in socializing citizens to have the
social and political virtues expected in a system of republican
government. Every political regime needs citizens to have character
traits that contribute to the regime’s overarching goals. As Michael
Zuckert explains, even in a regime dedicated to natural rights, the
government may establish and maintain “‘rights infrastructure’—the
pattern of social institutions and characterological types that makes
rights-securing possible.”62 The Virginia Constitution’s Bill of Rights
supplies a representative list of the character traits needed by a free
people: “[N]o free government, nor the blessings of liberty, can be
preserved to any people, but by a firm adherence to justice,
moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue.”63
Fourth, people may be better able to exercise some of their natural
rights if they use patriotism criteria to grant applications for
citizenship. This possibility matters the most in relation to natural
rights to engage in social activities. People cannot associate with one
another without common ground rules, and in many cases, they need
governments to establish those ground rules. But different peoples
may rely on different ground rules for similar associations, and people
in one community may reasonably demand that prospective citizens
understand and respect the ground rules and goals they have set for
associations in that community. Consider the application of the
territory of Utah for United States statehood. Polygamy was widely
practiced and tolerated in the territory of Utah. Congress barred the
practice and barred Utah from becoming a state until it barred the
practice.64 Congress prevented Utah and Utahans from associating
with the citizens of the then-existing States on equal terms. Congress
was motivated by a range of concerns: Citizens comfortable with
polygamy would jeopardize poorer men’s rights to marry, women’s
rights to be treated equally in marriage, children’s rights to be raised
in stable families, and the rights of all adults except male polygamists
to associate politically as equals.65
62. MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, LAUNCHING LIBERALISM: ON LOCKEAN POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 283 (2002).
63. VA. CONST. art. I, § 15.
64. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164–66 (1878) (discussing the
act codified at 12 Stat. 501 (1862)); see also Jessie L. Embry, Polygamy, UTAH HIST.
ENCYC.,
https://www.uen.org/utah_history_encyclopedia/p/POLYGAMY.shtml
[https://perma.cc/QW27-HJCM] (July 10, 2021) (reporting that Utah recently
enacted a law reducing the penalty for polygamy from a felony to a misdemeanor).
65. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165.
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To be sure, if a political community follows a theory like the one
just sketched, it relies on commitments that could be described as
republican and nationalist. But those commitments get subordinated.
They come to be part of the community’s project to the extent that they
run consistent with and help strengthen its most basic liberal
commitments.
To avoid confusion, when a community strives both to secure
rights and promote patriotism, the efforts to promote patriotic policies
do not justify violations of the rights of outsiders. As Thomas West
explains, natural rights obligate every people “not [to] harm
foreigners’ lives, liberty, or property. But when [a people] refuse[s] to
admit foreigners to [its] community, [it] do[es] not treat them unjustly
or deny them their rights. [It] simply leave[s] them in the same
condition they were in before.”66 In other words, natural rights set
baselines. Those baselines mark off standards of conduct that decent
societies should not violate. Communities may structure their laws,
policies, and social institutions to secure citizens’ rights far more
effectively than citizens could enjoy the rights outside those
communities. But to that extent, communities generate benefits to
their citizens. Patriotic communities may justly withhold those
benefits from noncitizens, but they may not justly violate the rights of
noncitizens.
VII. RECONSIDERING LOCAL CITIZENSHIP IN A GLOBAL AGE
Now, the last Part provided only a highly compressed sketch of
the reasons why a theory of natural rights and liberalism might expect
patriotism of its citizens, and why it might institute requirements for
citizenship that evaluate applicants for citizenship by how patriotic
they promise to be. But the sketch should make clear that patriotic
liberal views are not crazy. Since they are not crazy, they have
important ramifications for the argument in Local Citizenship in a
Global Age. I want to close by considering that book’s argument in
light of the last Part’s observations about patriotic liberal views—and
also in light of Part IV’s observations about the effects of
cosmopolitan passions in politics. Again, as Part II explained, Local
Citizenship in a Global Age makes it seem inevitable that globalization
would overwhelm the control that state and national governments have

66. THOMAS G. WEST, VINDICATING THE FOUNDERS: RACE, SEX, CLASS, AND
JUSTICE IN THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA 158 (1997).
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exercised over immigration. Part IV and the last Part make that trend
seem less inevitable.
Three implications go to the descriptive claims of Local
Citizenship in a Global Age. First, assume that some citizens oppose
open immigration and easy paths to citizenship. What motivates such
citizens—liberal views, republican views, or ethno-nationalist views?
The book strongly suggests that such citizens are in the grip of ethnonationalist views. At the outset, the book assumes: “Among the
Americans who elected Donald Trump President, there is a seething
anxiety over the perception that the meaning of citizenship is being
diluted.”67 In the book’s three-model framework, only ethnonationalists can be the kinds of people in the grip of “seething
anxiety.”68 But there is a possibility not considered: Maybe those
citizens are liberals who think that republicanism, patriotism, and
familiarity with important cultural traits all reinforce liberalism.
Now consider the citizens and political leaders who stand in
opposition to the citizens who seem as seething and anxious. In Local
Citizenship in a Global Age’s three-part framework, the only factor
that can explain why such citizens and leaders might support
extending citizenship, the franchise, and public benefits is a
commitment to liberalism. To be sure, many people do sincerely
believe that people who are not United States citizens should be
entitled to citizenship, the right to vote, and the benefits that states and
the federal government extend to citizenship if they want to move
here. Since the book suggests that citizens and leaders who oppose
easy paths to citizenship are motivated primarily by ethno-nationalist
views, by logic and fairness it really should have considered whether
citizens and leaders who support broad access to citizenship are
motivated primarily by cosmopolitan sentiments.
One last descriptive question. When municipalities make policies
about citizenship, how influential are, on one hand, (what Stahl calls)
republican and ethno-nationalist or (what I prefer to call) patriotic
liberal views, and, on the other hand, liberal or cosmopolitan views?
Local Citizenship in a Global Age reports that there is a “trajectory”
and “pattern” in favor of expanding the franchise and its perquisites to

67. STAHL, supra note 4, at 3.
68. See id. at 7 (describing Trump voters as “hav[ing] turned a resentful eye
toward cities”); id. at 8 (“backward-looking, place-bound, and racialized conception
of citizenship”); id. at 17 (“quasi-nationalist xenophobia, in which outsiders are
ostracized and scapegoated”).
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noncitizens.69 Is the trend that pronounced? In the book’s report, the
franchise has been extended by the state of New York (in school board
elections, until elected school boards were abolished), the city of
Detroit, and ten Maryland municipalities; municipalities in Maryland,
Vermont, and Massachusetts have at least debated extending the
franchise.70 In my view, those extensions are not widespread enough
to say that there is a clear and unshakeable consensus for expanding
the franchise. I interpret the same facts as follows: Some
municipalities support federal immigration policies, many more say
little about those policies (probably because they think they have little
to add), and a small number of municipalities go in a different
direction—in states that tend to be progressive in national politics and
cosmopolitan in their outlooks.
The concerns I am expressing here have normative implications
as well. Again, one of the two main lessons of Local Citizenship in a
Global Age is that local governments can and sometimes should set
citizenship policies different from the ones set by state or federal
governments.71 Part III studies three different conceptions of
citizenship that municipalities might try to promote—if globalization
creates new challenges that the state and national governments are
incompetent to address, and if the liberal conception seems too “thin
[a] gruel” for municipalities to promote.72 In Parts IV and VI, though,
I identified two considerations that militate in favor of limiting
municipal policy-making on citizenship. As Part VI explained,
citizens in any community have strong interests in being assured that
fellow citizens are loyal to their common political project and wellsocialized enough to respect important institutions like marriage,
contract, and political processes. In a federal system, central
governments are better positioned than municipal governments are to
factor in the effects of policies on common culture; in the United
States, that difference favors limiting municipal control over
immigration policy and keeping such control in the hands of the states
or the federal government.73
Separately, Local Citizenship in a Global Age suggests that state
and federal policies often rely too much on the ethno-nationalist
model, and it also suggests that municipal governments can counteract
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 14.
See id. at 2–3 n.6.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 48–49.
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these tendencies.74 Fair enough. Since every government can make
mistakes, however, a full account of citizenship federalism needs to
anticipate that municipal governments might make mistakes when
they institute policies affecting citizenship. As Part IV showed, people
can get caught up not only in desires to be surrounded only by people
of similar races or nationalities but also in cosmopolitan desires to
downplay traits and habits that distinguish particular peoples. That
possibility needs to be considered in a full account of citizenship
federalism, and it is not in Local Citizenship in a Global Age.
Finally, the concerns that motivate opponents of broad citizenship
and easy immigration seem more serious than they seem in Local
Citizenship in a Global Age. Opponents may not necessarily be
motivated by desires to exclude people of different races or
nationalities. Instead, opponents may believe sincerely that a free
people cannot govern itself unless its members have the traits that Part
VI associated with patriotism. Concerns like those would justify
citizenship policies that require proof that new citizens understand
important aspects of American government and social life. They also
justify withholding from people who are not citizens public benefits—
access to property, public education, and public health care—intended
primarily for fellow citizens. Now, these concerns might be
overwrought, or such concerns might not justify the citizenship and
welfare policies now in effect in federal or state law. But the concerns
are serious and durable. Because Local Citizenship in a Global Age
hastens to study new forms of local citizenship, it passes hastily over
these concerns.

74. See, e.g., id. at 83.

